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Josef Seifert and Barry Smith1 
(Internationale Akademie fiir Philosophie im Fiirstentum Liechtenstein) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We recall that according to Ingarden each literary work of art manifests 
four strata: the stratum of word sounds and sound-complexes; the 
stratum of meaning-units or of word-meanings and higher-order mea-
ning complexes (the meanings of sentences, etc.); the stratum of repre-
sented objectivities (made up of the characters, actions, moods, scenes, 
etc. which are represented, for example, in a novel); and the stratum of 
schematized aspects (made up of the sequences of adumbrations in 
which the represented objectivities are given to the reader).2 
Our topic here is Ingarden's account of sentence-meanings, and 
more precisely his theory of quasi-judgments. 
If I say: "The sun is shining", then I express meanings (concepts) 
by means of these words. These meanings are united together into a 
meaning of a higher order, the meaning of the whole sentence, and in 
and through this complex meaning-unit a certain objectivity (a state ·of 
affairs) is meant or intended. The object of a sentence-meaning is, 
according to Ingarden, a "purely intentional object", a correlate of the 
sentence-meaning which depends for its existe.I1ce on the existence and 
on the content of certain conscious acts, acts of judgment and constitu-
ent acts of meaning. Ingarden draws a very sharp contrast - and this is 
the core of the general ontology which stands behind his investigation of 
the literary work of art - between the heteronomous, mind-dependent 
1 The present essay goes back to a lecture of J. Seifert on Ingarden's theory 
of quasi-judgments which was delivered at an International Conference on Ingarden 
held in Liechtenstein in 1989. 
2 See Roman Inglirden. The Literary Work of An, transl. and introd. by 
George G. Grabowicz (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
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purely intentional correlates of word- and sentence-meanings, and the 
really existing objects and states of affairs in the world. 
Here lie deep philosophical problems, linked to what we take to be a 
serious error especially of Husserl after 1905, and also of Nicolai 
Hartmann, both of whom held that the only entities which can serve as 
the objects of conscious acts are "purely intentional objects'; all other 
objects would eit~er have to be denied as absurd "things in them-
selves", as the later Husserl proceeds to do, or they would have to be 
assumed as mere posits. According to Nicolai Hartmann, real properties 
of things are to be retained, but only as "never given transcendent 
objects and real categories" which can at best be assumed to coincide in 
part with the purely intentional objects and categories given in our 
acts. 3 It is in the acceptance or rejection of the possibility of reaching 
through to real objects in our conscious acts that there lies the funda-
mental division between the realist phenomenology of the original 
phenomenologists of the Munich school, 4 and the new-fangled transcen-
dental, idealist, Neo-Kantian, or existential phenomenologies of their 
successors. 
3 See Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuge einer Metaphysik des Erkennens, 4th ed. 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1949), pp. 47, 61 f., 81 ff., 106 ff. The case of 
deceptions proves, according to Hartmann, that although the intentional objects of 
cognition are not immanent contents of consciousness, they are nevertheless distinct 
from the real objects which as such can never become objects of consciousness. 
Consequently, he charges Husserl with having presented - in the Logical Investi-
gations - an oversimplified critique of the image-theory of knowledge and of 
, having overlooked the radical immanence of consciousness which he expresses in 
the following way: "It belongs to the essence of consciousness that it can never 
grasp anything besides its own contents, that it can never reach outside its own 
sphere." Op, cit, p. 62. In denying what Husserl calls 'the transcendent transcen-
dence' of knowledge and defending instead its 'purely immanent transcendence', 
Husserl adopted later the same view as Hartmann. For a critique of this epistemo-
logical immanentism and subjectivism see Josef Seifert, Erkenntnis objektiver 
Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 
2nd ed., 1976), pp. 69 ff., 233 ff., and Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenome-
nological Foundation for Classical Realism(London: Routledge, 1987), ch. ii ff. 
4 See Adolf Reinach, 'Concerning Phenomenology,' transl. by Dallas 
Willard, The Personalist 50 (Spring 1969), pp. 194-221. Reprinted in Perspectives 
in Philosophy, ed. Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1961 
and 1969); also translated as 'What is Phenomenology?', by David Kelly, Phi-
losophical Forum, 1, pp. 231-256; see also the new edition of: Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, with an Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert 
(London: Routledge, 1991), ch. iv. · i 
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The view of the realist phenomenologists is that in the act of authen-
tic cognition the object of which we are conscious is identical with the 
real thing itself: the thing itself, and not just a "purely intentional 
object", becomes present to our mind. Real beings or facts or states of 
affairs that exist or obtain independently of our intentional acts can at 
the same time serve as intentional objects of cognition and of 
judgments. Ingarden himself adopts a modified realist position of this 
sort. A simple positive perceptual judgment to the effect that, for 
example, "This rose is red" has, it is true, two objects, on Ingarden's 
view: a purely intentional object and, an autonomous object, the latter 
being a real, mind-independent thing or state of affaires. We are, he 
holds, directed to the latter only via the former. Moreover, Ingarden 
insists that not all judgments, and not even all true judgments, are 
directed towards autonomous states of affairs in this sense; thus for 
example he holds that true negative judgments ("This rose is not 
yellow") relate to objectual complexes which have no existence in the 
things themselves. 5 Now certainly it is true that nothing can be known 
except through conscious acts; yet from this it by no means follows that 
real states of affairs as such can never themselves become also inten-
tional objects. Moreover, only if the human mind can have real states of 
affairs as intentional objects of cognition, is knowledge possible and 
doubt able to be overcome. 
That it can be the real object itself which I attain to in at least some 
of my acts of judgment is seen, for example, by the case in which I 
judge that I exist. Here I do not have merely "a purely intentional 
object" which would be the only object of my/ consciousness and 
through which I could merely "intend" my real existence. Rather, my 
real existence itself is given to my consciousness. 
In his account of the purely intentional correlates of sentences, 
Ingarden distinguishes between what he calls the 'original' and the 
'derived' purely intentional object. The former is the direct object of an 
individual conscious act of for example imagination. It is such as to 
draw its entire essence and existence from the acts in which it is ima-
gined. Derived purely intentional objects, in contrast, are as it were 
abstractions from their original, subjective counterparts, and draw their 
existence and essence rather from corresponding meaning-units and 
from the common understanding of a community of readers. 
The original purely intentional objects, as Ingarden conceives them, 
are not immanent parts of the corresponding acts. As Husserl had 
5 See Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vol. 11/1, ch. XI. 
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shown very clearly in his Logical Investigations, regardless of whether 
Jupiter or the house of which I dream is real, it is certainly not a part of 
my conscious experience. If I search into my conscious acts, I will not 
find any Jupiter there or any house with windows and doors. 6 The 
original purely intentional object thus possesses a certain distinctness 
from the act itself. Yet it is still wholly dependent on my act. It exists 
only if I think it or imagine it and only according to how I imagine it. It 
possesses, in Ingarden''s terms, a merely heteronomous mode of existen-
ce. Thus it is not completely nothing; but its being is dependent entirely 
on my conscious acts. 
The derived purely intentional correlates of meaning-units, in 
contrast, have with respect to our conscious acts a merely relative 
dependence - and thus also a relative independence. In this they are 
similar to the meaning-units of sentences themselves; these too have a 
relative independence in relation to the intentional acts in which they 
originated. Thus, for example, if someone writes a book or poem, the 
meaning-units of his words remain; they are there to be re-activated, 
even after his original creative acts have passed away. 
Both the meanings of the sentences that occur in a literary work of 
art and the derived purely intentional objects which correspond to them 
possess a certain intersubjective character, as contrasted with the purely 
subjective character of the original purely intentional objects. The 
purely intentional objects of my acts of imagination are not accessible to 
you. However, as soon as I express in language the content of what I 
have imagined, then meanings and the associated derived purely inten-
tional objects become intersubjectively accessible. 
The derived purely intentional correlates of the sentences and other 
higher-order meaning units to be found in works of literature thus 
constitute a certain objective sphere which is absolved of the pure 
subjectivity by which original intentional objects are characterized.7 A 
price has to be paid for this independence, however, in the form of a 
6 The same thesis was reiterated by Adolf Reinach. See his "Concerning 
Phenomenology", op. cit. 
7 One is reminded here of K. Popper's theory of the three worlds. The 
objects of Popper's World 3 appear to have just the kind of weak independence 
which Ingarden grants to the "derived purely intentional objects", though it must . 
be said that Popper's account of this interdependence is less subtle than is that of . 
Ingarden. A decisive difference between Popper and Ingarden consists in this: · 
Ingarden identifies the world of fiction as mind-dependent, while he recognizes 
many other ideal inhabitants of world 3 which are autonomous in their being, such ... 
as ideal objects and essentially necessary states of affairs. All of these are quite , 
generally regarded by Popper as creations of world 2 (the world of the mental). · 
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certain schematization which afflicts the derived correlates as compared 
to their o~iginal counterparts. If, for example, somebody tells me: "I 
am dreammg of Monterrey; I see myself there now and see before me 
the ~oun.tains around the city," then this original experience is much 
too nch m .conte~t to be conveyed through linguistic meanings alone. 
.The pure~y mtent1~nal objects to which I have access by understanding 
the meanmgs of his ~o~ds are less .conc~ete, less vivid and 'less richly 
filled, ~an are the ongmal purely mtent10nal objects from which they 
are .denved. We ca~ convey by means of language only the general 
outh.nes ~f our expenences, from which the sensory richness and other 
quahficat1ons have been filtered away. 
. Th.e~e. are, accordingly, "places of indeterminacy" in all represented 
?bJeCtlVlties that are made accessible through works of literature. These 
m turn explain the need for acts of concretizing on the part of the 
readers of such works. 
2. THE QUASI-JUDGMENT AND THE APPARENT JUDGMENT 
So much by way of introduction. We wish to concentrate in what 
follows on the central thesis of Ingarden's analysis of the stratum of 
meaning units, a thesis which is put forward in § 25 of The Literary 
Wor~ ?f Art. Here Ingarden argues in favour of what he refers to as the 
~uasi-Judgmental ch.aracter of all declarative sentences appearing in the 
literary wo:k. 8 Earlier Ingarden had delineated literary works in such a 
way as to mclude under this heading not only literary works of art but 
, also newspaper articles, scientific works, works of belles-lettr~s, and so 
on.
9 All. such works are indeed like literary works of art in being 
charactenzed by the four-fold stratified structure referred to above. In 
§. 25, however, Ingarden understands "literary work" in a more exclu-
sive manner as a work of fiction in a quite specific sense. 
. 8 Ibid., pp. 160 ff. See likewise Roman Ingarden, The Cognition of the 
Literary W~rk of Art, trans. by R.A. Crowley and K.R. Olson (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1973), especially pp. xxiii xxvi 12~13 63-64 68-69 
7ln, 147, 215n, 224. ' '· · ' ' ' 
9 ·This is problematic, too, because Ingarden calls his book not The Literary 
~ork b~t The ~ite~ary Work of Art. See R. Odebrecht's remarks and Ingarden's 
m~uffic~ent replies m The Literary Work of Art, p. 8, note 1. The problems linked 
with this value-freedom and restriction appear especially in the context of such 
val~e-~aden terms as "the polyphonic unity of the literary work of art" which plays 
a significant role later in Ingarden's work. 
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As Ingarden points out, the declarative sentences in scientific works 
do express judgments in the strict and proper sense, judgments that can 
be either true or false, and all such judgments make a claim to truth. In 
fact, a judgment can be false only because it makes a claim to truth 
which is then contradicted by the relevant actual state of affairs in reali-
ty. In literary works of art, in contrast, we find many declarative 
sentences which do not express judgments and which do not make a 
claim to truth. It is o'ur aim in what follows to identify the peculiar 
meaning and character of such declarative sentences, which Ingarden 
distinguishes rightly from the genuine judgments of science. 
If we take a sentence like "My fountain pen is lying on the desk", 
then there are at least three different ways in which we may understand 
it: 
1) as a mere "declarative proposition", the meaning of a declarative 
sentence. For example I say in the context of a grammatical discussion: 
"Let us consider the sentence 'My fountain pen is lying on the desk'." 
The sentence is here merely considered abstractly; I do not express a 
judgment by means of it. 
2) But if I say: "My fountain pen is lying on the desk" and do really 
mean that my fountain pen lies on the desk, then of course I do express 
a judgment by means of the given sentence. There is, in the judgment, 
an intentional directional factor (here corresponding to the subject-
expression "my fountain pen") which relates to an object that is inten-
ded as existing; in addition there is in the relation established between 
subject- and predicate-concept a function of assertion. The state of 
affairs which is determined by the sentence is posited as truly existing. 
It is in this that there resides the claim to truth involved in every 
judgment, a claim to be adequate to the actual state of affairs itself. 
3) As it were between these two possibilities lies what Ingarden calls 
the "quasi-judgment". Such quasi-judgments are not judgments and thus 
to call them true or false would be to misunderstand their meaning. 
They share only, as Ingarden puts it, the external habitus of judgments; 
it is merely as if they were judgments. They serve to constitute a world 
rather than pass judgments about it; and they serve this purpose by 
evoking the impression of asserting something about real events and real 
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characters. The quasi-reality which the artist constitutes thereby has the 
character of being simulatedly real. 10 
Thus at the beginning of Manzoni' s novel I Promessi Sposi there is 
described the cowardly Don Abbondio, pastor of the village, who is 
supposed to preside over the wedding of Lucia and Renzo. A powerful 
man who wants to marry or seduce Lucia sends two of his bravos -
criminal servants of the sort frequently found in the Italy of the 16th 
and 17th centuries - to threaten Don Abbondio with death should he 
preside over the wedding. All the mentioned events are described by 
Manzoni in sentential forms, but these are sentential forms which 
merely resemble those of bona fide judgments. We may express the 
nature of the meaning of the declarative sentences in a novel by saying 
that through them something is asserted but yet not seriously asserted. 
We deal, in the quasi-judgment, with a fundamental modification of that 
function of asserting which is proper to the judgment as such. In both 
cases there is a certain transposition of the pure meaning of the declara-
tive 'Sentence into the real world. Yet the quasi-judgment does not 
present what Ingarden calls a "real positing matching intention", i.e., it 
does not assert anything about the real world. Rather, it serves to build 
up a world which is merely to be considered as real for the purposes of 
the given novel. In the literary work of art, then, the states of affairs 
are not seriously posited; there is no setting of these states of affairs or 
objects into the real world. This is true both on the level of derived 
intentional correlates as also, in a proper and faithful reading, of our 
original intentional acts themselves. 
3. CRITIQUE OF INGARDEN'S TAXONOMY 
It is very questionable, however, whether all declarative sentences 
occurring in works of literary art are quasi-judgments as Ingarden 
maintains. 11 
10 One could refer here to the philosophy of "as if' of Vaihingt:r. See Hans 
von Vaihinger, Die Philosophy des Als Ob (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1911), 
Eng. trans. by C. G~ Odgen, The Philosophy of "As if" (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., 1924). While Vaihinger's name does not appear iit the indexes of 
~he Literary Work of Art or The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, Ingarden 
himself refers to him explicitly in his The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, p. 
214, note 39. 
11 For the absolutistic claims of Ingarden on this point see, for example, The 
Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, pp. xxvi; 215, note. See also Ingarden, The 
Literary Work of Art, p. 180, where Ingarden regards it as unquestionable that 
poetry "in no case ... is composed of judgments". See Kate Hamburger, Die Logik 
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Ingarden does, certainly, admit that there are historical novels in 
which a certain matching is effected between the fictional and the real 
world, where the author intends to match the general types or even 
strictly individual facts that occur in novels with actual historical events, 
and personalities. Clearly, however, in the historical novel it is not 
really claimed that all of the events related took place exactly ·as de-
scribed, as if the literary work of art were a historical work and would 
make judgments for example about what historic personages actually 
said. The matching relationships involved as between the meanings of 
declarative sentences in historical novels and real persons and events 
are, as Ingarden correctly points out, different from those involved in 
works of history proper. 12 We shall return to this point later. 
Ingarden also draws attention to another literary phenomenon to be 
distinguished from that of the quasi-judgment, namely the apparent 
judgment. This, too, is a thought-formation of a type that is expressed 
in a declarative sentence, and apparent judgments can be imputed either 
to the author or narrator of a novel or to the represented characters, 13 
We can in fact speak of three sorts of apparent judgment in the literary 
work, though these are not explicitly distinguished by Ingarden: 
i. "Real judgments" made by the fictional characters represented in 
a work. These possess all the characteristics of judgments, including the 
truth-claim, except that they possess these marks in the mode of the 
constituted, fictional world only. They are authentic judgments, but 
merely represented ones. They are apparent and not real judgments 
because the fictional characters who make them are not real. They 
partake in the irreality of the represented character whose judgments 
they are. 
ii. Poetic judgments of the narrator or author which judge about the · 
constituted world as if it were real. These differ from apparent judg-
ments in the first sense in that it is not the irreality of their subject 
which makes them apparent, but much rather the irreality of their 
object. Apparent judgments in the first sense can never be passed by 
real persons or by the real author when he speaks as such. Their 
essence lies in the fictional nature of their author. Apparent judgments 
der Dichtung (Stuttgart, 1957). Her criticism - which must not be entirely 
dismissed although it shows a number of weaknesses - was examined by Ingarden 
himself. See his Literary Work of Art, § 25a, pp. 173 ff. 
12 See his Literary Work of Art, p. 171. 
13 Op. cit., p. 172. 
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in the second sense can be made by real authors when they speak as 
such, or by parents when they talk with their children about a fairy tale 
and say: "yes, then the bad wolf came". Apparent judgments in the 
second sense can be attributed to real persons but they can never be 
about real states of affairs and objects, while apparent judgments in the 
first sense can deal with any real object; consider e.g. Ivan Karama-
zov's statements about the suffering of innocent children and the scandal 
that lies therein. 
Apparent judgments in the second sense are apparent only as long as 
both their object is purely fictional and they judge simultaneously about 
this object as if it were real. Thus they are distinguished from genuine 
judgments about the fictional world (for example on the part of the 
literary critic or of the author himself), which do not reflect the 'as if 
real' character of the represented objectivities. Apparent judgments in 
this second sense are thus opposed to real judgments not primarily 
because they have the fictional world as object but because they judge 
about it as if it were real. They are distinguished from quasi-judgments 
in that the latter have the task of building up the world of the novel, 
where the former judge about this world as it were from without, as 
something already constituted. 
Apparent judgments in the first sense can of course also be apparent 
judgments in the second sense and frequently the two coincide; but this 
is by no means necessary. 
iii. Apparent judgments in a third sense can appear in real life as 
well as in literature. Take, for example, ironic judgments which appear 
to judge one thing - and do in a certain way judge it - but in reality 
they contain their own opposite. Similar cases arise also e.g. in jokes, 
in witty remarks, etc. In comedies, such apparent judgments in the third 
sense possess an important function. Think, for example, of Nestroy's 
Truth-Couplet from Die Anverwandten, where the refrain 'Ah, d' 
Wahrheit is in gute Hand' (Yes, truth is in good hands) conveys preci-
sely the opposite of that which is intended. 
Ad i. Apparent judgments in the first sense are not real because their 
authors, e.g. Zosima, are not real persons. Consider an example. 
Suppose that we read in a novel a sentence such as: 'Zosima said, 
"Every man must die."' Here Zosima's judgment is an apparent judg-
ment in the first of our three senses here distinguished. It makes a claim 
to truth, is true, sincerely intended, etc. - but its author is not a real 
human subject but a fictional character. Therefore it cannot be regarded 
as a real judgment of the author or of any other real person. Therefore 
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any immediate conclusion from such apparent judgments to real judg-
ments of the author is illegitimate. For example, we cannot infer that 
Giuseppe Verdi judged that 'after death there is nothing and heaven is a 
big lie' from the fact that Iago judges this way in Verdi's opera Othello. 
Such apparent judgments belong, Ingarden holds, to the represented 
world and thus they cannot be viewed as the expression of the opinions 
of the author or as real judgments. Their merely apparent and irreal 
character remains the same whether or not their object (the state of 
affairs which they assert) obtains or does not obtain. 
I 
Ad ii. Concerning the second meaning of 'apparent judgments' we 
have to recognize, with Ingarden, the profound modification which 
judgments undergo when they do not refer to the real world but to a 
fictional world and when they treat this world as if it were real. Ingar-
den is doubtless correct when he underlines this point and when he sees 
that the quasi-judgment and the apparent judgment in this second sense 
differ as much from each other as from real judgments. 
On the other hand, however, Ingarden affirms, rigorously, that 
apparent judgments in our first sense, i.e. the represented judgments of 
represented characters, can refer only to the fictional world. He thereby 
collapses our distinction between apparent judgments in the first and 
second sense. 14 We shall consider .later the question whether he is 
correct in this. Certainly it seems that the apparent judgments attributed 
to literary characters do on occasion' speak of the world as such, and 
not merely of the world represented in a work. One can likewise find 
cases of apparent judgments which refer to the world of another, 
distinct literary work or to this other work itself. Think of the pastor's 
verdict on books treating chivalry and errant knights in Cervantes' Don 
Quixote. Or one can imagine apparent judgments (in our first sense) 
which pertain to general concepts or qualities or other worldly pheno-
mena and therefore are not apparent judgments in the second sense. 
Consider Portia's remarks on mercy and justice in Shakespeare's The 
Merchant of Venice. 
Ad iii. Apparent judgments of the third kind play a particular role in 
the dialectics of wit and comedy, where the overt assertion of one state 
of affairs is in fact the assertion of another, quite different one, in a 
way which gives rise to countless different combinations. The narrator 
in a novel very often uses apparent judgments in this third sense. 
14 See Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, pp. 172 ff .. 182-185. 
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In such cases the sentences attributed to the narrator may fail to 
express judgments merely for reasons similar to those which prevent 
e.g. an ironic judgment from being a judgment in the strict and proper 
sense. The lack of seriousness and reality of the judgment is here not 
grounded in the irreality of the person who thinks or utters it nor in the 
irreality of the represented world but in an inner modification of the 
assertive function and of the meaning of the judgment itself. Its truth-
claim is modified; it is, as it were, taken back. Similarly, the modifica-
tion of the assertive function of apparent judgments of the narrator can 
for purely literary reasons be such as to give to his assertions a pathetic, 
dogmatic, or skeptical character. All of these forms are, however, 
encountered also outside the context of the literary work. Their exist-
ence in the literary work thus lends no credence to lngarden's claims as 
to the quasi-judgmental character of all straightforwardly declarative 
sentences of the literary work. 
Real or genuine judgments of the transcendent narrator15 : The cases 
which seem to speak most strongly against lngarden's claims in this 
respect are not apparent judgments at all, however. Rather they are 
declarative sentences of the narrator or author which express judgments 
in the strict and proper sense. These are meaning-units which do not 
serve to constitute the fictional world but rather judge about this world 
in one of several different ways. Here we are concerned not with 
declarative sentences that are put into the mouth of the narrator as 
persona as part of the fictional world. Rather we are concerned with 
those cases where the narrator or author makes assertions which are as 
it were transcendent to the action of the novel, for example assertions of 
the form: "The events described in these pages never happened" or 
assertions relating, again, to general concepts or qualities having in 
themselves nothing to do with the action of the novel. In some such 
15 The term 'transcendent narrator' should not be taken as suggesting the 
separation of a primary narrator/author and some second narrator/persona (who is 
simultaneously a persona in the literary work). It refers simply to the fact that the 
narrator - whether real or fictional - takes a stand which is transcendent to the 
novel, for example when he expresses real judgments which are not simply part of 
the constituted represented world and which speak about the real world, or when 
he makes judgments have the character of meta-statements about the work itself 
and about the values of the characters represented therein. Clearly it will not in 
every case be clear whether we are dealing with a transcendent narrator in this 
sense or with a mere persona. There are nonetheless clear cases of each, and it 
goes without saying that even one clear case of the former is e.nough to cast serious 
doubt on Ingarden's claims. 
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cases, certainly, it seems that we have to do with judgments that are as 
real and authentic as any that might be found for example in a scientific 
work. They are real i. because they are real judgments of a real author· 
ii. because they are judgments about the real objective world (or some~ 
times about that part of it which is a world of fiction, but which is then 
explicitly recognized as such); and iii. because they are intended in 
exactly the sense expressed overtly in the corresponding meaning-units 
and not in any other sense. 
In order better to understand the distinction between quasi-judg-
~ents, apparent judgments 1in our three distinguished senses, and real 
judgments, it will be useful to introduce some further examples of each. 
Some thoughts expressed in literature are certainly quasi-judgments 
in Ingarden's sense. Thus, when Dostoevski in The Idiot describes a 
~rain and two men riding on it, then this description consists of quasi-
judgments. When, however, Dostoevski gives us the judgments which 
Zosima makes when he meets three women who ask him for counsel 
these judgments are not quasi-judgments but apparent judgments in th~ 
first of our three senses above. They most definitely make a claim to 
truth and resemble in every way the judgments we make in real life -
except that they belong to the world of fiction and are uttered by 
persons who do not really exist. Think of the scene in The Brothers 
Karamazov where a young mother has lost her three-year old boy and is 
unconsolable. Zosima now says to her something like this: "You should 
weep and you should not stop weeping, as Rachel wept for her children; 
but when you weep, you should always think that your son is with the 
an?els of God;. when. you keep believing this and contemplate it, your 
pam and suffermg will, after a while, be transformed into the joy that 
you will feel when partaking in the bliss of your son." These statements 
are certai~ly not quasi-judgments without any claim to truth; they are 
?pparent judgments which resemble exactly the corresponding real 
judgments, except that they are situated in the simulated world of fiction 
and somehow partake in the fictional nature of the latter because their 
?uthor is not real. As we have seen, Ingarden insists that such apparent 
judgments can refer only to the represented world and can neither refer 
to, nor be true about, the real world. 
As examples of real judgments of the transcendent narrator, consider 
Manzoni's reflections in I Promessi Sposi, on absolute secrets among 
close friends which, via other close friends, travel fast and reach on the 
evening of the same day the person from whom they should have been 
kept secret. These reflections are certainly true of the real world. 
Moreover they are meant to be so, or at least: nothing prevents us from 
assuming that the poet meant them to be real judgments which he 
109 
himself held true. Here, too, however, Ingarden holds rigorously to his 
general thesis to the effect that all declarative sentences to be found 
within the compass of the work of literary art fall short of the status of 
judgments in the strict and proper sense. Examples of judgments 
inserted into the text of the novel which are about this novel as such can 
be found in very many works of contemporary literature. Judgments of 
this sort, and the various tricks which can be played therewith, can be 
said, indeed, to be characteristic of much contemporary fiction (see e.g. 
the works of Calvino or Borges). 
4. OBJECTIONS TO INGARDEN'S ABSOLUTIZATION OF THE 
QUASI-JUDGEMENT 
The problem of dramatic works 
As already mentioned, Ingarden seems not to have sufficiently investi-
gated the different types of modification which a judgment undergoes 
when it is a quasi-judgment and when it is an apparent judgment in one 
of the three senses distinguished above. 
In some works of literature, namely in dramatic works, there are 
practically no quasi-judgments in Ingarden's sense at all, but rather only 
apparent judgments in the first of our three senses. Indeed, Ingarden 
seems to have had in mind in working out his analyses of literature an 
overly restricted diet of examples derived especially from the realms of 
the novel and short story and also from certain related kinds of poetry, 
such as ballads. His attempts to extend his theory to the drama yield 
one of the most artificial theses in the book. For Ingarden is led to 
affirm first of all that there are in fact two texts in each drama: the 
main text and the side text; and secondly that what is actually the side 
text, namely the explanations of the author as to the course of the drama 
(stage directions such as: "Enter Hamlet stage left", etc.), constitute 
what is really the main text, corresponding in the novel to the story that 
is told by the narrator. 16 If a drama is lacking in stage directions, then 
we must imagine quotation marks at the beginning and end of the play, 
and imagine them prefixed by the expression of a quasi-judgment to the 
effect that: 'The characters say: ... ' The declarative sentences in the 
drama itself would then express apparent judgments in the first of our 
three senses. The makeshift character of this theory should at least cast 
suspicion on Ingarden's thesis to the effect that it is the quasi-judgment 
16 See The Literary Work of Art, §§ 30 and 57. 
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which is the only or the principal type of judgment that is to be found in 
the literary work of art, quite apart from the fact that stage-directions 
are neither quasi-judgments nor apparent judgments in any of the three 
senses, but something completely different, namely, instructions meant 
to be carried out in reality. 
The case of the drama without stage-directions is the clearest of 
those cases where the apparent judgments w})ich are put into the mouths 
of characters are all we have in the way of text. In ancient Greek 
tragedy and in some later dramas stage directions are not to be found. 
Thus the stratum of meaning units and the represented world here partly 
coincide - or better, the stratum of meaning-units is here completely 
absorbed by the stratum of represented objects. Something like this may 
be found also in works of other kinds, for example in Dostoevski's The 
Delicate Woman or in Nikolai Gogol's Diary of a Madman, in which 
almost all the represented world is constituted by the apparent thoughts 
ascribed to some represented character. Hence one cannot always draw 
such a sharp distinction as lngarden seems to indicate between the 
stratum of represented objectivities and the stratum of meaning-units -
the two may largely coincide. This implies a certain crisis for Ingar-
den's theory of the stratification of the literary work of art; at least his 
theory must be developed more carefully, by way of a treatment of all 
major species of literary works of a sort that would overcome the one-
sided perspective that is introduced when one concentrates too centrally 
on the case of the standard, classical novel. 
Certainly we do not dispute the important role of quasi-judgments in 
many works of literature. Our claim is merely that Ingarden overestima-
ted this role. The job of quasi-judgments, we will remember, is to 
determine or build up in cumulation the fictional reality that is represen-
ted in the work. But surely it is a trivial fac;t that all sentences in the 
novel do in fact contribute to building up the wor,ld of the novel in this 
way, so surely lngarden is right after all. 
To see the flaw in this argument let us recall the nature of quasi-
judgments. As a result of their structure, quasi-judgments are neither 
true or false nor do they make a claim to truth. Quasi-judgments can be 
no more true or false than questions can, since neither is in the business 
of making assertions. At best we might say that quasi-judgments can be 
quasi-false or quasi-true, inasmuch as they are adequate to. the world 
which has been constituted by preceding quasi-judgments. Quasi-judg-
ments can be marked at best by a certain sort of immanent adequacy to 
the world in process of constitution, in a way which allows a great 
amount of freedom on the part of the author. In relation to the judg-
ments of what we called transcendent narrators, however, it seems clear 
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that these may be marked by just the same transcendent adequacy as 
that with which we are familiar in our normal dealings with the world. 
Let us take again the example of Manzoni' s novel. In i~ ~ere appear 
two main narrators: the narrator who represents Manzom himself, and 
the narrator of an ancient chronical which is quoted several times 
through the course of the work. Now Manzoni, or the principal narra-
tor, often says that he finds false what the older narrator has written. 
He says this not only with respect to the strictly historical state~en~ of 
the latter which Manzoni considers in the manner of a real h1stonan, 
but also 
0
with respect to his opinions about the fictional world of the 
novel. This shows that the fictional world has a certain kind of indepen-
dence; having been constituted (in whole or in part) by qua~i-judgments 
in a certain determinate way, one can be in error about it. Some, at 
least, of the judgments of a transcendent narrator in the novel can thus 
be treated in exactly the way we treat actual truths and falsehoods. Thus 
they are not apparent judgments at all - they are real judgments and 
they are analogous in this respect to judgments ~bout the .. relevant 
fictional world which are made, for example, by the hterary cnt1c. 
Ingarden, however, appears to hold that the author of a liter?ry 
work if he appears explicitly therein, appears always only as. belongmg 
to th~ represented world of the novel. 17 He is himself a character and 
his judgments. cannot therefor have the status of genuine judgments 
which would be true or false in the strict and proper sense but can be 
only apparent judgments in our first sense because their author is 
unreal. 
This view is questionable for two reasons. In the first place, as 
already indicated, we do not see why certain th?ughts expressed .by the 
author in the context of the work cannot be his own thoughts JUSt as 
much as could the thoughts expressed by any other subject. Secondly, it 
is of course possible that the persona differs from the author. The latter 
might for example deliberately choose to let a criminal character tell his 
own story, so that this character is at the same time the voice of the 
represented author who builds up the whole fictional world of the story. 
This double role of the persona as represented character and as narrator 
seems, however, to be a special contrivance, and certainly does not 
seem to be necessary for fiction and poetry. · 
17 This represented world contains, under this assumption, both the author 
who narrates the story and the story he narrates, and thereby enjoys a peculiar 
double structure of purely intentional states of affairs - the one layer of events 
unfolding in the novel proper being embedded within the layer of those states of 
affairs involving the narrator. See The Literary Work of Art, p. 207. 
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Authentic judgments and value-judgments about the constituted world 
and about the work itself 
An author qua transcendent narrator might, for example, say that in 
such and such a chapter such and such an event was described, and then 
he says something true. Similarly he may analyze truly or falsely the 
characters of persons he has earlier introduced. In The Betrothed, for 
example, we find many fine and true analyses of the characters of 
Renzo, Lucia, Don Abbondino, etc. These are certainly not the same as 
judgments about really existing persons or objects. Yet this need not 
take away their character of truth or their authentic character as judg-
ments. 
A further group of authentic judgments in the literary work of art 
are value judgments about constituted characters, about their moral or 
intellectual worth, and so on. These, too, we claim, can be no less true 
or false than the corresponding judgments concerning real people. Note, 
hereby, that the values of his characters are not constituted by the 
author in the same sense in which his characters are constituted· whe-
ther or not the latter have such and such values (or would have them if 
they existed). is in a sense beyond his control. He cannot describe a man 
in a certain way and then ascribe to him a moral character other than 
the one that objectively results from these and those facts. Just as in 
reality the moral value of persons and of their actions depends upon 
those persons and their actions themselves, so also the moral values or 
disvalues which are found in the actions of literary figures are, at least 
to some degree, independent of the author and not arbitrarily constituted 
by him. It is then not at all a fiction that such and such characters 
possess such and such values - though of course always in the fictional 
world and ih the fictional mode, i.e., as quasi-real values. 18 
It is possible that the author has an adequate understanding . of these 
values and that he expresses correct value-judgments in descriptions of 
them. Analogously, however, it is also possible that an author judges 
his characters falsely from an axiological point of view and that we are 
disturbed in our reading by understanding that he does so. Thus in 
Robert Musil's work, and in some of the stories of Josef Roth one 
finds a conspicuous lack of proper value knowledge. While both a~thors 
are greatly to be admired from a literary point of view, in Musil's Man 
without Qualities a certain moral cynicism underlies the neutral, amora-
18 See on this the dissertation of John Barger, Quasi-Real Values in the 
Literary Work of Art (University of Dallas, .1976). 
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listic descriptions in the work in a way which can be seen, from certain 
perspectives, as a flaw of the work. 
Value judgments in a novel may be more or less explicit or implicit. 
In Manzoni, for example, they are very explicit. Manzoni was not only 
a great novelist but also a philosopher and saintly man. 19 The many 
value judgments which are interspersed throughout his book add to the 
value of the work, which Goethe described as the greatest novel ever 
written. In Dostoevski, to take another example, value judgments are 
much less directly and explicitly expressed, yet still they are present 
throughout his work, for example in the descriptions of Zosima or of 
Alyosha Karamazov. These value judgments have a certain claim to 
truth about an already constituted world. If they are false, then the 
novel may suffer as a work of art. 
Truths about individual facts in fiction 
Certain quasi-judgments and apparent judgments in literary works seem 
to be related to the real world in a way which Ingarden rules out. For 
Ingarden has a strong conviction, for which he never argues, to the 
effect. that it is impossible for any character who appears in a novel or 
in a drama to speak of any world other than that which is constituted by 
the fiction. 
Yet there are several different classes of judgmental thought-forma-
tions which seem to speak precisely of the real world and which none-
theless appear in literary works of art. Indeed it can be argued that by 
failing to recognize such formations and their special character one cuts 
oneself off from an adequate understanding of literature. We .shall try to 
show in what follows that both in apparent and in quasi-judgments, as 
well as in the real judgments of e.g. the transcendent narrator, literature 
can refer much more directly to the world beyond the fictional than 
Ingarden appears to believe. · 
Manzoni's I Promessi Sposi describes in painstaking detail the legal 
situation of Italy at the time when the story is set. It belongs to the tone 
of the historical parts of the novel that we are presented here with an 
accurate description of historical facts and not at all with a merely 
incidental similarity to real-world counterparts, as Ingarden himself 
would have it.20 Or take again Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. This 
is a work of literature, but at the same time it is directly stated in the 
preface to the work that nothing which follows is going to be anything 
19 It was for him that Verdi composed his Requiem. 
20 See The Literary Work of Art, pp. 170 f. 
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but a true account of events which he, the author, has recorded. It 
seems that nothing prevents one from finding genuine and true judg-
ments in such a work and that nothing in principle prevents such a work 
from being a literary masterpiece. The same is true of such autobio-
graphical works as for example Goethe's Aus meinem Leben. In a case 
such as the Confessions of St. Augustine, the fact that the story is true 
does not detract from the beauty of the work, and the latter would not 
be more beautiful if we knew that the whole text of the author contained 
only quasi-judgments which amounted to a merely fictional biography of 
its author. In fact, such untruth is disturbing in a biography - even 
from a literary point of view. It detracts from the beauty of Anna 
Magdalena Bach's portrait of the life and character of Johann Sebastian 
Bach when we learn that her Notenbachlein is spurious and that the 
biography of Bach contained in it is merely fictional. 
General Truths in Fiction 
Fully genuine judgments do certainly occur in literary works of certain 
kinds, above all in those literary works which are at the same time 
philosophical, biographical or religious works, such as the mystical 
poems of St. Theresa of Avila or of St. John of the Cross, or many 
poetic parts of the Scriptures. Similarly, there are many poems which 
speak about love or suffering and which convey true judgments about 
these matters in a way which does not at all detract from their status as 
works of literary art but rather adds to it. 
The most important kinds of judgments to be found in literature, 
however, relate not to individual historical facts or events but rather to 
general states of affairs about human nature or about other features of 
the world. Take for example Manzoni's above-mentioned description of 
the general fate of secrets. What Manzoni here describes is a fact well 
known to all of us and his remarks are certainly not at all meant as 
mere quasi-judgments relating to a constituted world. There are many 
such reflections; lyrical poetry abounds in them, but they are to be 
found in fact in every kind of poetic work. Take, for exarn,ple, Gogol's 
The Dead Souls, which contains a long reflection on how many people 
would have been quite different persons if in their youth they had 
encountered some spark of encouragement and were not growing up in 
such a world of darkness. Similar reflections are found in Dickens. Or 
take the famous words of Solzhenitsyn in the Gulag Archipelago on 
how the line between good and evil goes right through the heart of 
every man. 
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We would add that all of these kinds of judgments can occur also in 
the forms of apparent judgments, that is to say, they can be put into the 
mouth of the narrator or of the represented characters, but even this 
may occur in such a way that it is not at all justified to interpret them as 
mere reflections on a constituted world. To maintain such a view is, we 
hold, a certain lapsus mentis of Ingarden which can hardly be under-
stood in the work of a man of such philosophical rigour and reflection. 
Think of the philosophical reflections on mercy and justice in Shake-
speare's The Merchant of Venice (Porta) or in Measure for Measure 
(Isabel), of the reflections on the meaning of the human body in Titus 
Andronicus or on the theme of suicide in Hamlet. Or think of Nestroy's 
Gegen Torheit gibt's kein Mittel, in which there appear an intelligent 
poet and two brothers, one of whom is very intelligent, the other very 
stupid. The wiser brother comes to the poet and tells him: "Well, it is 
not a big problem. My brother is very stupid,, but I can support his 
weakness with my mental strength." And then the poet makes a reflec-
tion on the real essence of stupidity. He says: "You would be right if 
stupidity were a weakness of mind. But unfortunately it is a most 
terrible strength. It stands unmoved like a rock, even when a whole 
ocean of reason dashes its waves against it. A flippant character dis~ 
posed to evil was often cured by the soft breath of love, more often by 
the rough storm of experience; and even vices have often fled from the 
light of better convictions; only stupidity has fenced itself off behind a 
firm bulwark of stubbornness; when attacked it sticks out the pointed 
knives of maliciousness and thus stands invincible. Sad but true is the 
Proverb: 'Against stupidity even gods would fight without success' -
and you, miserable mortal, want to take upon yourself this gigantic 
battle?" And in another play of Nestroy, Der Unbedeutende, we find: 
"The essential difference between a mathematical and a social circle is 
that in the mathematical circle you find just one centre which is exactly 
in the middle. In the social circle, however, you find in the middle only 
the apparent centre, namely the tea-table; the real centre, around which 
the conversation turns, lies almost always outside of the circle, for it is 
normally the case that it is usually only the ones who are absent who 
are being maligned." 
Many of the apparent judgments which are contained in a literary 
work of art deal, then, with general states of affairs that pertain to life 
or to reality, to virtue or vice, to death and life, and they do not at all 
deal with any constituted world. 
We would add that in relation to many of these judgments one can 
with justice affirm that the author identifies himself with them, that the 
judgments are made much as if they were real judgments of a philoso-
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pher. In fact, many poets must to this extent be regarded also as philos-
ophers who make in poetic form judgments about the general nature of 
things. Thus in one of Gabriel Marcel's plays there occur the words 
"Aimer un autre c'est Jui dire 'tu ne mourras pas'." (To love somebody 
means to tell him "Thou shalt not die".) This is one of Marcel's key 
philosophical statements, and yet it is inserted into the context of a 
drama. One who reads the drama will understand, further, that it is not 
just an apparent judgment made by some hero. The intelligence of the 
literary critic consists partly in his ability to distinguish correctly these 
two cases. Through protagonists or through other characters the poet 
frequently expresses reflections which are evidently meant not only as 
characterizations of a quasi-existing character but also as statements that 
reveal the nature of reality itself. 
Of course, a poem can be beautiful even though it literally says 
some. untruth, as when Keats tells us that "truth is beauty, beauty truth, 
that ts all you know or need to know on earth". This is a false state-
ment, but it is nonetheless beautiful. Thus the beauty of literature is 
clearly not strictly or solely grounded in its truth and we do not wish to 
over-moralize or over-philosophize in our treatment of the literary 
work. We do, however, insist that the truth of literary statements may 
be crucial to the beauty of the works in which they appear. 
Such statements may be decisive for the literary work also for the 
reason that one may discover in them some of the reasons for the 
formulation of the quasi-judgments or for the appearance of the other 
forms in and through which the world of fiction is constituted. For the 
intention to create a world may flow in part from the fact that one 
wants to convey through this constituted world some understanding of 
the general nature of things. To the extent that this is true, that it 
captures the motivation of at least many poets, it follows that the 
purpose of literary quasi-judgments is to give rise to bona fide judg-
ments, to knowledge in the strictest sense. Even if these judgments need 
not always be expressed, the reader can gain the corresponding know-
ledge even without its being proclaimed as such. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Ingarden's discovery that there are quasi-judgments, quasi-questions, 
quasi-wishes, etc., is a very important one for the understanding of 
literature, and his reflections on apparent judgments, too, represent a 
philosophical discovery of note. But his views on these matters can 
nonetheless be criticized, and part of this criticism touches upon the 
theory of stratification itself; for it appears that an adequate theory of 
,.,_ ____________ _ 
117 
the structure of the literary work must be more complex and subtle than 
the theory which Ingarden defends. Before concluding, however, it will 
be worth our while to consider how Ingarden might respond to the 
charges levied against him in the above, for this will reveal that there 
are in fact two distinct approaches to literature, only one of which has 
been properly acknowledged by lngarden himself. 
Consider, first of all, the charge that Ingarden ignores or under-
values the role of what we have called the transcendent narrator, and 
more precisely that he fails to recognize the fact that the author may 
insert true genuine judgments into the text of his work - judgments for 
example about the form of the work, about the unfolding of the plot, 
about the moral value or disvalue of its characters, or indeed about 
quite incidental issues, which the author holds true and which can be 
recognized as true by the reader. To this Ingarden might reply, first of 
all, that the existence of such judgments as true and genuine judgments 
is of no relevance to the value of the literary work as a work of art, and 
that it is of no relevance either to the properly aesthetic concretization 
of the work. There are, as already noted, experimental novels which 
seek to exploit interleavings of more or less incidental commentary on 
the part of a transcendent narrator for aesthetic purposes. Even in such 
cases, however, it seems that the question of the status of such com-
mentary as a matter of genuine judgments or as a matter of truths is not 
relevant to the artistic success of the writings in question. 
Moreover, in relation to the putative judgments of a transcendent 
narrator, the question can legitimately be raised as to how we are to 
establish that they are sincerely intended by their author as judgments of 
a bona fide sort. Such matters belong, surely, to the author's biography 
and are not of relevance to the work itself and to any properly aesthetic 
reading - or where they are of relevance, for example in relation to a 
work such as Augustine's Confessions, then we are dealing, as Ingarden 
himself recognizes, with a special borderline case of the literary work 
of art. 21 
In this, as in all things, lngarden is concerned to maintain clear lines 
of separation between distinct categories of work of art, where others 
(including artists themselves - and this with apparently ever-increasing 
determination) are concerned to break down such lines of separation. 
Moreover, he is concerned to maintain clear lines between art and other 
domains (of religion, ethics, science, and so on) even though he is 
prepared at the same time to acknowledge the existence of border areas 
21 See The Literary Work of An, p. 301. 
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and sometimes even of borderline cases which span the boundaries of 
domains which are otherwise separate. Ingarden would surely not wish 
to deny that one can find genuine and important general truths, for 
example truths of a moral nature, in many great works of poetry or in 
many novels and plays. He would not deny, either, that one can use 
such works, e.g. for edifying purposes, in ways which centrally involve 
appeals to the truths in question as judgments seriously intended. He 
would insist, however, that this is to put one sort of thing (a work of 
art) to a purpose which does not immediately reflect its essence (as one 
might, for example, use a book as a doorstop). 
Is such a defense, however, based on true insights? Does it prove 
that all literary works contain quasi-judgments or only apparent judg-
ments? Does it eliminate the need for distinguishing quasi-judgments 
more clearly from apparent judgments and to show that there are in fact 
three quite different kinds of apparent judgments? Does if prove that 
apparent judgments can deal only with the constituted world, and does it 
substantiate Ingarden's claim that there are no real judgments about the 
real world or about the work itself within the literary work of art? We 
would suggest that the correct answer to all of these questions is a 
negative one, so that our criticism of Ingarden's view remains intact. 
Moreover, if we are right that different varieties of real judgment are 
contained in literary works of art, then the aesthetic role and value of 
such judgments can hardly be disputed, and thus our point remains that 
there are many works of art whose properly aesthetic value is tied 
inextricably to a dimension of moral or other truths. Ingarden has 
sought to capture part of what is involved here in his doctrine of 
metaphysical qualities as well as in his essay on the different senses of 
truth in the literary work of art. The task remains, however, to under-
stand more deeply how truths of judgmental formations can be involved 
in the ontological structure of the literary work in a way that can 
contribute also to its value as artistic and aesthetic object. 
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STRATA IN INGARDEN'S ONTOLOGY 
Peter M. Simons 
University of Salzburg 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the concept of stratum as employed by Ingarden in 
his ontological investigations of works of art. Attention is focussed on 
literary works, which are said to have four strata, two belonging to 
language itself. I find Ingarden's stratified account of language correct 
in principle but defective in execution. In the ontology of literary 
works, the stratum of schematized aspects is particularly problematic, 
and I interpret these as complex meanings, correlated with another 
element of the work not given sufficient recognition by Ingarden: the 
Reader. I suggest the terminology of strata for artworks in general is 
dispensable. 
§1 Introduction 
Ingarden is primarily an ontologist, although he is generally best known 
for his work in the philosophy of art, especially his two books on the 
literary work of art. Even here, his treatment of artwork is primarily 
ontological, with epistemological questions as to our access to and mode 
of cognition of literary works taking second place. A notable feature of 
Ingarden's ontology of artworks is his emphasis on the concept of strata 
(Schichten). One of the important ways of distinguishing artworks of 
different kinds, according to Ingarden, lies in the number and kinds of 
strata possessed by these works. The strata range in number from· one 
to four according to the kind of work in question: one for music; two 
for painting, sculpture and architecture; four for works of pure litera-
ture. Of course the mere number of strata is not the only difference 
between these different kinds of artwork, but in Ingarden's scheme it is 
one of the most important differences. The literary work's ontological 
